

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 01001 01 OF 07 241725Z

42

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 EB-07 /094 W

----- 024210

R 241620Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0273

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 7 USNATO 1001

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: WORKING GROUP PAPER ON US AIR MANPOWER
PROPOSALS

REF: (A) USNATO 932; (B) USNATO 853; (C) USNATO 764; (D)
USNATO 686; (E) USNATO 560; (F) STATE 20905; (G) STATE 22970;
(H) STATE 31509

1. MISSION TRANSMITS BELOW NEW DRAFFT OF WG PAPER ON US AIR
MANPOWER PROPOSALS WHICH ACTING WG CHAIRMAN REVISRQZWEFLECT
SUGGESTIONS AT FEBRUARY 18 WG MEETING.WG WILL RETURN TO THIS
PAPER MARCH 4.

2. COMMENT: WG HAS CONTINUED THIS STUDY UNDER ITS OWN MOMENTUM,
EVEN THOUGH US AIR MANPOWER PROPOSALS ARE NOT AT PRESENT ON
SPC AGENDA. MISSION IS NOT SURE OF RELEVANCE OF THIS EFFECT IN
VIEW OF WASHINGTON'S REVIEW OF AIR MANPOWER ISSUES. HOWEVER,
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01001 01 OF 07 241725Z

PROGRESS ON THIS PAPER MAY HELP TO LIMIT ANY REQUESTS FOR FURTHER
STUDY WHEN WASHINGTON SENDS INSTRUCTIONS ON US PROPOSALS MENTIONED
IN STATE 31509. ORGANIZATION OF PRESENT DRAFT REFLECTS EXTENSIVE
UK INPUT. NETHERLANDS REP HAS ALSO PROVIDED DETAILED AMENDMENTS.

WHILE EMPHASIZING NEED FOR EXHAUSTIVE STUDY, FRG REP HAS PROVIDED LITTLE DIRECT COMMENT ON TEXT.

3. FEW REMAINING POINTS ON WHICH WG REPS HAVE REQUESTED U.S. CLARIFICATION ARE:

A. SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS (USNATO 686 AND PARA 3B U.S. NATO 764)

B. ADDITIONAL U.S. GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS (PARA 3 D USNATO 764)

C. FLANK CONCERNS (PARA 4 USNATO 560 AND PARA 2 USNATO 932)

D. EFFECT ON COMBAT CAPABILITY OF U.S. AIR MANPOWER CUTS AT 15 PERCENT LEVEL (PARA 3 USNATO 560)
SHAPE REP HAS EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THIS LAST POINT.

4. FRG REP (HOYNCK) HAS RAISED WITH MISSION OFFICER AND IN WG QUESTION OF HOW THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF MANPOWER PERCENTAGES WOULD BE DETERMINED LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ASKED WHETHER THE PERCENTAGES WOULD BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE OTHER SIDE OR DECIDED INDEPENDENTLY BY EACH SIDE. HOYNCK HAS NOT PURSUED THIS ISSUE AND MISSION OFFICERS HAVE AVOIDED COMMENT PENDING FURTHER GUIDANCE ON PARA 1 OF STATE 20905. PARA 13 F WG DRAFT IMPLIES THAT THE U.S. IN CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES WOULD SELECT AN OPTIMUM MIX WITH THE LEAST IMPACT ON U.S. COMBAT CAPABILITY. CLARIFICATION OF THIS POINT COULD HELP REASSURE ALLIES ON CONCERNS NOTED IN B,C, AND D OF PARA 3 ABOVE.

5. MISSION HAS CIRCULATED ON WG REPS U.S. ANALYSIS (PARA 2 STATE 22970) OF HOW SOVIETS MIGHT TAKE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. FRG REP EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THIS CONTRIBUTION ON ISSUE IN WHICH BONN WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: BY MARCH 4, COMMENT ON POINTS LISTED IN PARA 3 ABOVE AND ON WG DRAFT TRANSMITTED BELOW.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01001 01 OF 07 241725Z

7. BEGIN TEXT:

THE ROLE OF THIS PAPER IS TO PROVIDE AN ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE US PROPOSAL ON AIR MANPOWER OF 15 JAN 75(1).
(NOTE: THE TERM "COMMON CEILING" HAS HITHERTO BEEN USED, AND IS GENERALLY INTERPRETED, AS A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES. IT IS USED IN THAT CONTEXT THROUGHOUT THIS PAPER. THE TERM "COMBINED COMMON CEILING" IS USED IN THE PAPER TO DESCRIBE A COMMON CEILING WHICH INCLUDES BOTH PLUS GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER. THE TERM "SUB-CEILING" MAY APPLY TO SERVICE (GROUND OR AIR) SUB-CEILINGS

WITHIN A COMBINED COMMON CEILING OR TO NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS.
WHERE THE CONTEXT REQUIRED IT, IT WILL BE DEFINED AS
EITHER "SERVICE SUB-CEILING" OR "NATIONAL" SUB-CEILING.)

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE US PROPOSAL

2. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE US PROPOSAL WITH
RESPECT TO PHASE I ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. IN PHASE I, THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION EACH REDUCE
15 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL OF THEIR COMBINED GROUND AND AIR FORCE
MANPOWER IN THE NGA.

B. US AND SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO
INCLUDE AT LEAST 15 PERCENT(1) OF US AND OF SOVIET GROUND
FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA. SOVIET GROUND REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTINUE
TO INCLUDE A TANK ARMY(2) OF ABOUT 68,000 GROUND PERSONNEL
AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

C. THE US FOR ITS PART WOULD BE WILLING TO INCLUDE SOME
AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN ITS PHASE OF REDUCTIONS DESCRIBED IN
PARA A. ABOVE. THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF THE MANPOWER REDUCTION
PERCENTAGES WOULD BE A MATTER FOR DETERMINATION IN A LATER
POINT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

E. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE US PROPOSAL FOR PHASE TWO
IS TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILINGS(3). THIS
MENAS THAT THE ULTIMATE RESULT OF REDUCTIONS, IN PHASIS ONE AND
TWO, WOULD BE EQUAL TOTAL LEVEL (NUMBER) OF GROUND AND AIR
PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES, THE AT ILLUSTRATIVE LEVEL OF 900,000.

(1) THE 15 PERCENT REDUCTION, CALCULATED ON ALLIED ESTIMATES OF
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01001 01 OF 07 241725Z

USSR MANPOWER, COULD AMOUNT TO 71,000 MEN.

(2) THIS WOULD MEAN WITHDRAWAL OF 4 ARMOURED AND ONE MR
DIVISIONS

(3) DEFINITIONS ARE PROVIDED AT ANNEX B.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01001 02 OF 07 241753Z

51

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 EB-07 /094 W

----- 024508

R 241620Z FEB 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0274
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 7 USNATO 1001

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABOVE PROPOSAL FOR PHASE TWO, THE US INTENDS TO ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF VOLUNTARY INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS (FOR BOTH SIDES) UNLESS THE ALLIES THEMSELVES DECIDE TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION. THE US WILL NOT PRESS ANY ALLY TO INCLUDE AIR PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS IN PHASE TWO, AND WILL SUPPORT ANY ALLY IF IT DECIDED NOT TO INCLUDE REDUCTIONS OF ITS AIR PERSONNEL. IT WILL BE EVIDENT, THAT IF THE NSWP COUNTRIES WERE TO TAKE ALL OR A HIGH PROPORTION OF THEIR REDUCTIONS IN APPROACHING THE COMMON CEILING IN GROUND MANPOWER, IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE ALLIED AIM OF REDUCING THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES, AND, CONVERSELY, IF NATO COUNTRIES WERE TO REDUCE SOME AIR MANPOWER THEY MAY IN PART MEET THE WP'S AIM.

5. THE US DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS APPROACH CREATES ANY PRECEDENT FOR PHASE TWO OTHER THAN OPTIONAL INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS MADE BY INDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. NEVERTHELESS, THE REDUCTION BASE, THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS, AND
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01001 02 OF 07 241753Z

THE COMMON CEILING WOULD ALL BE AFFECTED WERE THE US PROPOSALS TO BE ACCEPTED. THIS PAPER EXAMINES, ON A HYPOTHETICAL BASIS, THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS IF AIR MANPOWER WERE TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS IN THAT PHASE: AND SIMILARLY EXAMINES THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER, WITH OPTIONAL AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, IN THE COMMON CEILING.

6. THIS PAPER ADDRESSES THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE US PROPOSAL IN FOUR SECTIONS, AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION I: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PHASE ONE.

SECTION II: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PHASE TWO.

SECTION III: THE IMPLICATIONS COMMON TO BOTH PHASES (VERIFICATION, CIVILIANISATION, RE-DEFINITIONS AND THE SUB-CEILING ISSUE).

SECTION IV: MILITARY/TECHNICAL FINDINGS OF THE WORKING GROUP (TO BE ISSUED LATER).

SECTION I: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PHASE I
NUMERICAL EFFECTS

7. THE NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF THE US PROPOSAL, APPLICABLE IN PHASE ONE, AIR SHOWN IN ANNEX A. THE MANPOWER FIGURES

TAKEN AS THE STARTING POINT ARE EXTRACTED FROM THE LATEST ALLIED ESTIMATES AVAILABLE, FOR BOTH ALLIED AND WP MANPOWER. IN THAT CONNECTION, THE WORKING GROUP EMPHASISE THAT THE ESTIMATES OF ALLIED AND WP MANPOWER ARE PREPARED ON DIFFERENT BASES; THE ALLIED MANPOWER BEING GENERALLY THE "ACTUAL STRENGTH" COUNT AT END-1974, WHEREAS THE WP FIGURES REPRESENT AGREED NATO INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AS OF MID-1974. THE WP FIGURES MAY BE SUBJECT TO ERROR BY AS MUCH AS 10 PERCENT.

8. AS COMPARED WITH CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR PHASE ONE, THE US PROPOSAL OF 15 JAN WOULD, IF ADOPTED, ENTAIL LARGER NUMERICAL PHASE I REDUCTIONS OF BOTH US (PLUS 5,100) AND USSR (PLUS 9,750) FORCES: AND WOULD INCREASE THE NUMERICAL DISPARITY BETWEEN THE REDUCTIONS BY A FURTHER 4,650. GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD BE INCREASED TO THE EXTENT THAT THE US AND USSR APPLIED THE ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS TO GROUND RATHER THAN AIR MANPOWER.

OTHER MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PHASE ONE

9. THE US AUTHORITIES HAVE SUMMARISED (1) THE EFFECTS,
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01001 02 OF 07 241753Z

FOR THEIR AIR FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA, OF REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER AT 5 PERCENT, TEN PERCENT AND FIFTEEN PERCENT. THE US FIND THAT NONE OF THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (2) IN THE NGA.

10. THE WORKING GROUP ACCEPT THAT:

A. US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AT FIVE PERCENT COULD BE MAKE IN THOSE SUPPORT AIREAS THAT AIR ALREADY PROGRAMMED FOR REDUCTION TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY AND FOR ECONOMY REASONS. THE EFFECTS ON US AIR POSTURE IN CENTRAL EUROPE ON THE ALLIANCE WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT.

B. A TEN PERCENT REDUCTION WOULD INVOLVE FURTHER THIN-OUT OF MANNING LEVELS. ADDITIONALLY, WITHDRAWAL OF A MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP WOULD BE ENTAILED: THIS COULD BE RETURNED BY M PLUS THREE IF REQUIRED. THE THIN-OUT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE US OPERATIONAL OR READINESS POSTURE TO ANY SIGNIFICANT EXTENT. THERE WOULD BE SOME REDUCTION IN RESPONSIVENESS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS AIREA, WHICH COULD BE MADE GOOD AT SHORT NOTICE.

(1) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/74-154, 2 DEC 74

(2) NOTE: THE TERM "TACTICAL FIGHER AIRCRAFT" INCLUDES ALL COMBAT AIRCRAFT OF USAFE, EXCEPT TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (C-130) WHICH IS CALLED IN US TERMINOLOGY AS A COMBAT AIRCRAFT.

C. AT THE 15 PERCENT LEVEL, US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD

BEAR MORE HEAVILY, AS INDICATED IN THE US ANALYSIS(1). REPLACE-
MENT OF THE WITHDRAWN MEN AND UNITS MIGHT NOT BE EFFECTED BEFORE
MPLUS23. IF ANY ELEMENTS AFFECTING COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE
EARLY STATES OF WAR WERE INCLUDED IN THIS PACKAGE, IT COULD BE
UNDESIRABLE TO DELAY THE RETURN OF SUCH ELEMENTS UNTIL MPLUS23.

D. ALSO AT THE 15 PERCENT LEVEL, RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY OF
US TACTICAL UNITS IN THE NGA TO A CRISIS AREA IN THE USAF AIRA
OF RESPONSIBILITY(3), BUT OUTSIDE THE NGA, COULD BE DEGRADED
DUE TO THE RELOCATION OF TACTICAL AIRLIFT AND REDUCTION IN
MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT THAT MIGHT OCCUR.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01001 02 OF 07 241753Z

(3) IN CONTEXT, THIS WOULD BE TERRITORIES OF THE NORTHERN
AND SOUTHERN REGIONS OF THE ALLIANCE

E. NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS ON COMBAT CAPABILITY ARE
EXPECTED FROM AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OF US TO 10 PERCENT
BECAUSE WITHDRAWN PERSONNEL/UNITS CAN BE
REINTRODUCED WITHIN THE TIMES SCHEDULE OF
THE BUILD UP PROCESS. AT THE 15 PERCENT REDUCTION LEVEL,
EFFECTS ON COMBAT CAPABILITY MIGHT START TO BECOME
SIGNIFICANT DEPENDING ON THE TIME REQUIRED TO REINSTALL
ANY WITHDRAWN ELEMENTS OPERATIONALLY ESSENTIAL IN THE
EARLY DAYS OF WAR. THERE WILL BE NO WITHDRAWAL OF US
TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (SEE FOOTNOTE (3) TO PARAGRAPH 10D).

1. THE WORKING GROUP FINED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE US
PROPOSAL OF 15 JAN 75, FOR PHASE I WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING
CONSEQUENCES FOR PHASE I:

A. THE ALLIED AIM OF ACHIEVING LARGE GROUND FORCE
WITHDRAWALS BY THE USSR (INCLUDING A TANK ARMY OF APPROXIMATELY
68,000 MEN PLUS 1,700 TANKS) WOULD BE MAINTAINED.

B. AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS BY THE US IN THE NGA WOULD
NOT INVOLVE ANY SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF COMBAT CAPABILITY OR
READINESS, AT LEAST AT 5 PERCENT OR 10 PERCENT LEVELS. AT THE
15 PERCENT REDUCTION LEVEL, THE LOSS IN COMBAT CAPABILITY MIGHT
START TO BECOME SIGNIFICANT.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01001 03 OF 07 241838Z

51

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 EB-07 /094 W

----- 025019

R 241620Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0275

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO QMEMBASSY BONN 5800

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 7 USNATO 1001

12. AS SHOWN IN ANNEX A, US GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS MUST BE AT LEAST 28,950 IN PHASE ONE. HOWEVER, THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF US AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTION PERCENTAGES WOULD BE DETERMINED LATER. THUS, US GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS FOR PHASE ONE COULD EXCEED THE CURRENT NATO PROPOSAL OF 29,000 BY UP TO A THEORETICAL MAXIMUM OF 5,050 MEN (ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO A BRIGADE SIZE UNIT). WHETHER SUCH POSSIBLE, ADDITIONAL US GROUND FORCE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY WITHDRAWING INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS, OR WOULD REQUIRE REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF PEACE TIME COMBAT OR COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS CAN ONLY BE ASSESSED BY THE US. SUCH AN ASSESSMENT WOULD NECESSAIRLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE US ARE CURRENTLY INCREASING THE NUMBER OF COMBAT BRIGADES BY TWO THROUGH RESTRUCTURING OF EXISTING PERSONNEL. WHICHEVER METHOD IS FINALLY ADOPTED, IT WOULD BE OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE THAT THE COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF ANY WITHDRAWN UNITS OR PERSONNEL SHOULD BE PREPOSITIONED OR STOCK PILED, AT HIGH READINESS, IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR RAPID
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01001 03 OF 07 241838Z

RE-ACTIVATION IN EMERGENCY.

13. AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS DURING NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES, FROM THE MILITARY VIEWPOINT, WOULD WISH TO SELECT AN "OPTIMUM MIX" BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTION PERCENTAGES THAT WOULD HAVE THE LEAST IMPACT ON OVERALL COMBAT CAPABILITY OF US FORCES IN EUROPE.

14. WHETHER THE USSR WOULD ELECT TO REDUCE AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE ONE IS NOT KNOWN, NOR, IF THE USSR CHOSE TO REDUCE AIR MANPOWER, TO WHAT EXTENT, EXCEPT THAT UNDER THE US PROPOSAL SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE MORE THAN 7,750. HOWEVER, THE CONSIDERATIONS AT B AND C BELOW WOULD BE PROBABLY INFLUENCE THEIR DECISION.

A. NATO ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE
NGA ARE:

CATEGORY	NUMBER
COMMAND AND HQ STAFF	4,920
FLYING UNITS:	
COMBAT	39,310
HELICOPTER	(27,920)
TRANSPORT	(1,390)
AIR DEFENCE:	6,690
SUPPORT:	13,910
TOTAL	64,830

B. THE SOVIETS COULD EFFECT REDUCTIONS BY A "THIN-OUT",
BY WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS, OR A COMBINATION OF "THIN-OUT" AND UNIT
WITHDRAWALS. THESE OPTIONS COULD BE APPLIED IN ANY COMBINATION
TO THE ABOVE LISTED CATEGORIES OF SOVIET AIR MANPOWER IN THE NGA.

C. AS STQTED IN A PREVIOUS REPORT (AC/276-D(74)9), THE WARSAW
PACT (INCLUDING SOVIET) AIRCRAFT TO MANPOWER RATION IS HIGH.
THIS IS DUE, AT LEASE IN LARGE PART, TO THE WP PRACTICE OF USING
GROUND FORCES TO PROVIDE SOME GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND
SUPPORT SERVICES FOR THEIR AIR FORCES. SOVIET AIR MANPOWER IN
THEIR AIR FORCES IN THE NGA IS ENGAGED IN OPERATION AND IMMEDIATE
GROUND CONTROL AND SUPPORT OF AIRCRAFT. PRIMA FACIE IT IS
POSSIBLE THAT REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET AIR MANPOWER WOULD BEAR
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01001 03 OF 07 241838Z

DIRECTLY (TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN COMPARABLE US AIR MANPOWER
PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS) ON CAPABILITY, READINESS, AND PERHAPS
ON THE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT BASED ON THE NGA. DETAILED
KNOWLEDGE OF USSR AIR GORCE ORGANISATION, ESTABLISHMENTS,
MANNING LEVELS AND MAINTENANCE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE NECESSARY
TO QUANTIFY THE EFFECTS. THIS DATA IS NOT AVAILABLE TO NATO.

D. IT IS PROBABLE THAT IF THE SOVIETS CHOSE TO REDUCE AIR
MANPOWER, THEY WOULD DO SO IN THE WAY BEST SUITED
TO THEIR PURPOSE AND LEASE DEGRADING IN OPERATIONAL EFFECTS.
IN VIEW OF THE PROXIMITY OF SOVIET TERRITORY TO THE REDUCTION
AREA, IT IS AT LEAST A POSSIBILITY THAT THE USSR WOULD PREFER
TO WITHDRAW SELECTED AIR UNITS TO THE THREE WMDS, RATHER THAN
BEAR A MANPOWER REDUCTION WHICH WOULD REDUCE READINESS AND
CAPABILITY THROUGHOUT THEIR AIR FORCES IN THE NGA. AIR UNITS
SO WITHDRAWN COULD BE RAPIDLY REINTRODUCED PROVIDED THE
NECESSARY GROUND SUPPORT FACILITIES REMAINED AVAILABLE
IN THE NGA: THIS POSSIBILITY WOULD HAVE TO BE MITIGATED BY
A NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT.

E. SOVIETT REDUCTIONS TAKEN IN COMMAND AND HQ STAFFS OR
OR IN SUPPORT PERSONNEL MIGHT IMPACT LESS ON OPERATIONAL
CAPABILITY THAN REDUCTIONS TAKEN IN FLYING UNITS OR AIR DEFENCE

PERSONNEL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS MIGHT CONSIDER THAT THE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COMMAND AND HQ STAFFS AND TO SUPPORT AIR MINIMAL AND ESSENTIAL FOR CONTINUED EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS OF RESIDUAL SOVIET AIR FORCES IN THE NGA. IN SUCH CASE, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO LOOK TO THEIR FLYING UNITS OR AIR DEFENCE FOR REDUCTIONS. IN EITHER CASE, LESS THE USSR AIR FORCE IN THE NGA IS SUBSTANTIALLY OVERMANNED IN PEACETIME, IT IS PROBABLE THAT SOVIET AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ABOVE THE FIVE PERCENT LEVEL WOULD BEAR DIRECTLY ON FRONT LINE AIRCRAFT STRENGTH OR READINESS OR BOTH.

15. UNDER THE US PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO TAKE ALL OR A PROPORTION OF THEIR ADDITIONAL 9,750 REDUCTIONS IN GROUND MANPOWER. IF THEY WERE TO DO THIS, IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE STATED ALLIANCE AIM OF REDUCING THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES.

THE QUESTION OF PRECEDENTS CREATED FOR PHASE II
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01001 03 OF 07 241838Z

16. THE US NOTE OF 15 JANUARY STATES THE US BELIEF THAT THIS APPROACH DOES NOT CREATE ANY PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II OTHER THAN OPTIONAL INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS MADE BY INDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

17. THE US PROPOSAL OF 15 JAN, AS COMPARED WITH EXISTING TABLED ALLIED PROPOSALS, INTRODUCES:

A. THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER WITHIN A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING.

B. THE OPTIONAL INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS: AT A MAXIMUM LEVEL OF 15 PERCENT IN PHASE I AND WITH NO DEFINITION OF LEVELS FOR PHASE 2.

C. THERE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE A DEFINED NUMERIC COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES OR FOR AIR FORCES WITHIN THE COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING.

18. WITH REGARD TO 17A ABOVE, THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY DECLARED TO THE EAST THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR AIR MANPOWER AS A COMPLEMENT TO A MUTUAL COMMITMENT ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER (BETWEEN PHASES). THIS WOULD HAVE THE SAME PRACTICAL MILITARY EFFECTS AS A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING WITHOUT REDUCTIONS IN MANPOWER: WITH REGARD TO 17B., THE OPTIONAL INCLUSION OF US AND USSR AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT, IN ITSELF, MAKE THE ALLIES MORE VULNERABLE TO WP PRESSURE THAN CAN BE EXERTED ON THE BASIS OF CURRENT ALLIED PROPOSALS. NOR SHOULD A REFERENCE TO A MAXIMUM LEVEL FOR US/USSR AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I SET A PATTERN FOR PHASE 2 WHICH THE WP COULD EXPLOIT ANY MORE THAN THE SIMILAR REFERENCE TO

THE LEVEL (15 PERCENT) OF US/USSR GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN
PHASE I, LEADING, SIMILARLY TO A COMMON CEILING AT THE END
OF PHASE 2.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01001 04 OF 07 241849Z

51

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 EB-07 /094 W

----- 025093

R 241620Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0276

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 7 USNATO 1001

19. THE US NOTE OF 15 JAN MAKES NO MENTION OF THE QUESTION
OF SUB-CEILINGS FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCES. IF THE PROPOSAL MADE
TO THE EAST WERE TO DO SO, AND THAT PROPOSAL WERE ACCEPTED BY
THE EASE, IT WOULD SET AN OBJECTIVE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH
WOULD APPLY IN PHASE 2. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE US PROPOSAL
IN RELATION TO THE COMMON CEILING AIR DISCUSSED IN SECTION
THREE OF THIS PAPER.

2. THE WARSAW PACT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO AFFIRM
THEIR DESIRES: TO MAKE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OBLIGATORY:
TO INCLUDE AIR WEAPON SYSTEMS: AND, TO ACHIEVE SYMMETRIC
REDUCTIONS. THESE THREE ELEMENTS ARE BASIC TO THE WARSAW
PACT DECLARED POSITION: AND HAVE BEEN PERSISTENTLY PURSUED
IN VIENNA BY THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS.

SECOND SECTION

21. THE US NOTE OF 15 JAN PROPOSED THE INCLUSION OF AIR

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01001 04 OF 07 241849Z

MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING ENVISAGING THE
ULTIMATE RESULT OF REDUCTIONS IN PHASES I AND II AS AN
EQUAL TOTAL LEVEL (NUMBER) OF GROUND PLUS AIR PERSONNEL
FOR BOTH SIDES AT AN ILLUSTRATIVE LEVEL OF 900,000.
THE PROPOSAL MAINTAINS THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING,
ALBEIT EXTENDED. THIS SECTION OF THE WORKING GROUP PAPER
EXAMINES ISSUES RELEVANT TO PHASE II UNDER THE FOLLOWING
HEADINGS:

A. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH SIDES OF A COMBINED GROUND/
AIR COMMON CEILING AT AN ILLUSTRATIVE LEVEL OF 900,000
WITH OPTIONAL AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I ONLY.

B. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH SIDES OF OPTIONAL AIR
REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II AS WELL AS IN PHASE I.

C. THE RELEVANCE IN PHASE II OF
A DEFINED MINIMUM SCALE OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

A. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH SIDES OF COMBINED GROUND/
AIR COMMON CEILING AT AN ILLUSTRATIVE LEVEL OF 900,000
WITH OPTIONAL AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I ONLY

22. ASSUMING THAT NO ALLIED AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WERE
TAKEN IN PHASE II, AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBLE UK AIR
MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I, THE NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF
NATO GROUND FORCES THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE REDUCED TO MEET A
COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 WOULD VARY BETWEEN 84,300 (10.7
PERCENT WITH US AIR REDUCTIONS OF FIVE PERCENT IN PHASE)
AND 80,900 (10.2 PERCENT WITH US AIR REDUCTIONS OF 15 PERCENT).
SUCH GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SLIGHTLY ABOVE THE 10
PERCENT REDUCTION ENVISAGED FOR ALLIED GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS
IN C-M(73)83(FINAL).
DETAILS ARE GIVEN AT ANNEX B, PARA 2C.

23. SIMILARLY, ASSUMING THAT THE WARSAW PACT APPLIED
NO AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, THE NUMBER AND PER-
CENTAGES OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES TO BE REDUCED TO MEET
THE ILLUSTRATIVE COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 COULD VARY
BETWEEN A MAXIMUM OF 245,000 (26.1 PERCENT) WITH NO SOVIET
AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I; AND A MINIMUM OF 235,250
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01001 04 OF 07 241849Z

(25.1 PERCENT) WITH SOVIET AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OF 15
PERCENT IN PHASE I.

24. THE NATO GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL
(SEE PARA 22 ABOVE) WOULD BE HIGHER BY APPROXIMATELY
7,000 THAN THOSE ENVISAGED IN THE ORIGINAL ALLIED PROPOSAL,
AIMED AT A GROUND MANPOWER COMMON CEILING OF 700,000. THE
WARSAW PACT TOTAL GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS COULD ALSO BE
INCREASED, BY A MAXIMUM OF 30,000 IF NO WP AIR MANPOWER

REDUCTIONS WERE MADE. THE END RESULT OF THIS APPROACH WOULD BE APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES: THE ACTUAL GROUND MANPOWER LEVELS OF THE NATO AND THE WP COULD DIFFER BY A MAXIMUM OF 10,000 DEPENDING ON THE SCALE OF AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS BY US/USSR IN PHASE I. A DEFERENCE OF THAT MAGNITUDE IN RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT WHEN CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE SCALE OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS: RESPECTIVELY 235,000/245,000 AND APPROXIMATELY 3:1.

B. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH SIDES OF OPTIONAL AIR REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II AS WELL AS IN PHASE I

25. THIS PAPER EXAMINES THE POSSIBILITY THAT EITHER SIDE MIGHT IN PHASE II EXERCISE DISCRETION AS TO WHETHER THEY TAKE REDUCTIONS LEADING TO THE COMBINED COMMON CEILING IN GROUND OR IN AIR MANPOWER. HYPOTHETICALLY, NO MINIMUM LEVEL WOULD BE PRESCRIBED FOR THE GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS NOR A MAXIMUM SCALE FOR OPTIONAL AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. THEORETICALLY, THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES REDUCED TO MEET THE ILLUSTRATIVE COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 COULD VARY BETWEEN A MAXIMUM OF 245,000 WITH NO USSR AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I OR WARSAW PACT AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, TO A MINIMUM OF ABOUT 75,100 WITH USSR AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OF 15 PERCENT IN PHASE I AND ALL REDUCTIONS BY THE WARSAW PACT IN PHASE II APPLIED TO AIR MANPOWER (163,000).

26. THAT OUTCOME DOES NOT ACCORD WITH THE CONCEPT BEHIND THE ALLIED APPROACH, NOR WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ALLIED FOCUS ON ACHIEVING PARITY IN GROUND FORCES. THE BASIS FOR HYPOTHETICAL STUDY OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THEREFORE DEFINED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING APPROXIMATE SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01001 04 OF 07 241849Z

PARITY IN GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. THERE WOULD THUS BE AN UPPER LIMIT ON THE REDUCTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE BY EITHER SIDE IN AIR MANPOWER.

REDUCTIONS PROPORTIONATE TO GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER LEVELS

27. IT COULD BE HELD THAT IN ADOPTING A COMBINED GROUND/ AIR MANPOWER COMMON CEILING IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO APPLY REDUCTIONS PROPORTIONATELY TO GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER STRENGTHS. THE RATIO OF GROUND TO AIR MANPOWER FOR BOTH SIDES IS APPROXIMATELY 4 TO 1.

AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS (20PERCENT OF TOTAL REDUCTIONS) COULD THUS BE, FOR THE ALLIES 17,000 AND FOR THE WARSAW PACT 49,000; TOTAL GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASES I AND II WOULD BE, FOR THE ALLIES 69,000 AND FOR THE WP 196,000. RESIDUAL FORCES MANPOWER LEVELS WOULD BE:

GROUND	AIR
--------	-----

ALLIES 722,000 179,000
WP 740,000 159,000

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01001 05 OF 07 241914Z

42

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 EB-07 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01

INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00

NSC-05 BIB-01 /094 W

----- 025389

R 241620Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0277

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 7 USNATO 1001

28. THE RESIDUAL DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES
MANPOWER WOULD BE 18,000, IN FAVOUR OF THE WARSAW PACT;
ANS IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER 20,000 IN FAVOUR OF THE
ALLIES. THIS ARRANGEMENT COULD ERODE THE ALLIED
FOCUS ON ACHIEVEMENT OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.
THE PERCENTAGE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTION INVOLVED FOR THE
ALLIANCE (8.7PERCENT) FALLS IN THE RANGE OF HYPOTHETICAL
REDUCTIONS DISCUSSED IN THE SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS OF
THIS PAPER. THE PERCENTAGE OF AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS FOR
THE WP WOULD BE 23.6PERCENT.

REDUCTIONS AT HYPOTHETICAL PERCENTAGES OF AIR MANPOWER

29. THIS PAPER EXAMINES THE EFFECTS OF APPLYING
FOR PHASE II, AS FOR PHASE I, AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AT
5, 10 AND 15 PERCENT. THE NUMERICAL EFFECTS ARE SUMMARISED AT
ANNEX B. AS STATED IN A PREVIOUS REPORT, THE EFFECTS OF
SUCH MANPOWER REDUCTIONS CAN ONLY BE PROPOERLY EXAMINED, IN
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01001 05 OF 07 241914Z

THE FIRST INSTANCE, BY NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, EACH FOR ITS

OWN AIR FORCE. THE RESULTS OF SUCH STUDIES, EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF REDUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR OPERATIONAL READINESS, COULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

30 IN EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, FOR THE WP POST-PHASE I CAN ONLY BE CONSIDERED IN GENERAL TERMS. A VARIETY OF MEANS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO THE WP (AS TO NATO) TO MITIGATE THE DIRECT OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS: E.G. CIVILIANISATION, CHANGE OF MAINTENANCE ARRANGEMENTS: RECOURSE TO CONTRACT SUPPORT IN LIEU OF SERVICE LABOUR.

AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OF SAY 5 PERCENT OR MORE WOULD PROBABLY BEAR DIRECTLY ON FRONT-LINE AIRCRAFT STRENGTH OR READINESS OR BOTH, BUT THE EFFECTS WOULD BE LESS THAN ON THE SOVIET AIR FORCES.

31. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WP MIGHT WISH TO EFFECT PHASE II REDUCTIONS. THE WP HAS SUBSTANTIALLY MORE AIRCRAFT THAN THE ALLIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS DISPARITY IS LARGELY DUE TO THE HIGH NUMBER OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (PARTLY WITH AN AIR DEFENCE AS WELL AS A GROUND ATTACK CAPABILITY). THE NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE AIRCRAFT IS NOT SO DISPARATE. PERSISTENT DEMANDS BY THE EAST FOR REDUCTIONS IN NATO AIR FORCES WOULD INDICATE THAT THE EAST PERCEIVE THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE AIRCRAFT AS A MAJOR, IF NOT THE PRIMARY, THREAT TO THEM. IF THIS IS TRUE, THE EAST MAY BE UNWILLING TO REDUCE THEIR DEFENSIVE FIGHTER SCREEN TO ANY SIGNIFICANT EXTENT, EXCEPT IN TERMS OF AN OVERALL SYMMETRICAL TRADE AS ENVISAGED IN THE WP REDUCTION PROPOSAL OF 26 NOV 73. A REDUCTION IN WP OFFENSIVE AIR WOULD REDUCE WP CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT A GROUND ATTACK; A REDUCTION IN WP AIR DEFENCE UNITS COULD INCREASE THE NATO THREAT AS PERCEIVED BY THE WP.

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR GROUND FORCES

32. FOR THE GROUND FORCES, WHETHER NIL OR HYPOTHETICAL MAXIMUM 15 PERCENT AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WERE TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES IN PHASE II, THERE WOULD BE A MARKED REDUCTION IN THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTHS OF THE NATO AND WP FORCES. IF FULL REDUCTIONS WERE TAKEN BY THE GROUND
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01001 05 OF 07 241914Z

FORCES OF BOTH SIDES, OR IF THE REDUCTIONS WERE TAKEN IN AIR MANPOWER UP TO 15 PERCENT FOR BOTH SIDES, THE RESULTANT GROUND MANPOWER FIGURES WOULD FALL WITHIN 12,000 MAXIMUM RANGE OF DISPARITY: CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF RESIDUAL GROUND MANPOWER STRENGTHS FOR BOTH SIDES IN THE RANGE 700,000-730,000 SUCH AN OUTCOME COULD REPRESENT APPROXIMATE PARITY.

33. FOR NATO GROUND FORCES, THE RESULTS WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE ENVISAGED IN THE ALLIANCE FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL(1). IF THE FULL SCALE REDUCTIONS WERE BORNE BY THE ALLIED GROUND

FORCES, THE RESIDUAL GROUND FORCE AT 704,000 WOULD BE SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN THE 700,000 DERIVING FROM THE FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL(1). THE PERCENTAGE REDUCTION IN ALLIED GROUND FORCES WOULD BE 11 PERCENT, AS COMPARED WITH THE MAXIMUM 10PERCENT REDUCTION IN NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER SET OUT IN C-M(73)83(FINAL). TO THE EXTENT THAT ANY AIR MANPOER REDUCTIONS ARE EFFECTED BY ALLIED FORCES, THE ALLIED RESIDUAL GROUND FORCE WOULD RISE COORRESPONDINGLY ABOVE THE 704,000 FIGURE, TO A MAXIMUM OF 733,000 AT A HYPOTHETICAL AIR MANPOWER REDUCTION OF 15 PERCENT.

(1) NAC 2948

34. FOR WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES, THE EFFECTS WOULD ALSO BE BROADLY SIMILAR TO THOSE ENVISAGED IN THE ALLIANCE FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. A COMBINED (GROUND AND AIR) COMMON CEILING AT 900,000 COULD INVOLVE WP REDUCTION OF GROUND MANPOWER TO 692,000, RETAINING THE PRESENT ASSESSED WP AIR MANPOWER STRENGTH AT 208,000. TO THE EXTENT THAT WP NATIONS CHOSE TO TAKE REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER, THE RESIDUAL GROUND FORCE WOULD BE INCREASED UP TO A MAXIMUM OF 723,000 IF A HYPOTHETICAL LIMIT OF 15 PERCENT IS PLACED ON SUCH AIR FRECUCTIONS.

35. THE EXISTING PROPOSALS BY THE ALLIES AND THE US NOTE OF 15 '-', 75 REQUIRE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY (OF ABOUT 68,000 MEN AND INCLUDING 1,700 TANKS) IN PHASE I. THE ALLIANCE HAS NOT ADDRESSED THE FORM AND NATIONAL ALLOCATION OF WARSAW PACT (OR NATO) RECUTIONS IN THE LATER PHASE LEADING TO A COMMON CEILING. IT IS, HOWEVER, ENVISAGED THAT FURTHER WITHDRAWALS OF US GROUND FORCES
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01001 05 OF 07 241914Z

MIGHT BE NECESSARY.

36. ADDITIONAL GROUND PLUS AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS REQUIRED OF THE WARSAW PACT, PHASE I, COULD BE AS HIGH AS 163,000. ASSUMING 10PERCENT REDUCTIONS OF USSR AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I, AND AN UPPER LIMIT OF 15 PERCENT AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, WP GROUND AND AIR REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II WOULD FALL IN THE RANGE 133,000 - 153,000, (SEE ANNEX B PARA 4). GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ON THAT SCALE COULD NOT BE ABSORBED BY THIN OUT OF PERSONNEL EXCEPT AT THE COST OF A SUBSTANTIAL DEGRADATION OF TRAINING AND FORCE EFFICIENCY AND READINESS.

37. THE TOTAL WP REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED IN THE US PROPOSAL OF 15 JAN 75, AMOUNT TO 245,000: IF THE REDUCTIONS APPLIED TO AIR MANPOWER AMOUNTED TO 15PERCENT, THIS WOULD ENTAIL RECUTION OF 214,000 WP GROUND FORCES - 23 PERCENT. THIS REPRESENTS THE MANPOWER EQUIVALENT OF ABOUT 20 DIVISIONS. IT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT A TOTAL OF 20 DIVISIONS NEED

BE REDUCED TO MAKE A MANPOWER REDUCTION OF 214,000. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WITH ANY CONFIDENCE HOW, IF THEY ACCEPTED THE MANPOWER PROPOSALS, THE WARSAW PACT WOULD PROPOSE TO EFFECT THE REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01001 06 OF 07 242021Z

64

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 EB-07 /094 W

----- 026079

R 241620Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0278

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 7 USNATO 1001

38. THE END RESULT, HOWEVER, IF ACHIEVED AS ENVISAGED, WOULD ENTAIL A WITHDRAWAL OF AT LEAST 5 SOVIET DIVISIONS IN PHASE I, COUPLED WITH FURTHER WITHDRAWALS/REDUCTIONS EITHER OF UNITS OR OF PERSONNEL IN PHASE II. THE USSR ELEMENTS WITHDRAWN, ALTHOUGH REDUCING THE CONFRONTATION AND THE IMMEDIACY OF THEIR THREAT, WOULD CONTINUE TO POSE A POTENTIAL THREAT. A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE ALLIES - APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA IN TERMS OF MANPOWER - WOULD HAVE BEEN ATTAINED. SOME MILITARY ADVANTAGE MIGHT ACCRUE TO NATO IN THE EVENT THAT THE EAST ELECTED TO REDUCE AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE II. A GREATER ADVANTAGE WOULD ACCRUE IF ALL WP PHASE II REDUCTIONS WERE TAKEN IN GROUND MANPOWER.

C. RELEVANCE IN PHASE II OF A DEFINED MINIMUM SCALE
OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS

39. THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE IN PHASE II IS APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES. THIS AIM IS MAINTAINED IN THE US NOTE OF 15 JAN 75. THE EXISTING ALLIED TABLED PROPOSAL

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01001 06 OF 07 242021Z

DEFINED THE GROUND REDUCTIONS PROPOSED FOR BOTH US/USSR IN PHASE I; TOGETHER WITH THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF A COMMON GROUND MANPOWER CEILING AT ABOUT 700,000. THE GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS REQUIRED TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE WERE READILY CALCULABLE BY EACH SIDE FOR ITS OWN FORCES.

40. THIS PAPER NOTES THAT, IF A MAXIMUM FLR AIR REDUCTIONS WERE NOT DEFINED, IT COULD PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR THE EAST TO EXPLOIT THEIR PRESSURES FOR SYMMETRIC CUTS IN GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER AND ASSOCIATED ARMAMENTS. THEY COULD ARGUE THAT THE ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS DEMANDED BY THE ALLIES SHOULD BE COUNTER-BALANCED BY CONVERSE ASYMMETRY IN THE REDUCTIONS APPLIED TO AIR FORCES, THUS MAINTANING THE BALANCE.

41. ESSENTIALLY, IN MILITARY/TECHNICAL TERMS, THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE NO NEED TO DEFINE A MINIMUM LEVEL FOR GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONSIN PHASE II, PROVIDED A MAXIMUM LEVEL FOR AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IS DEFINED.

SECTION III: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLATERAL MEASURES:
OF POSSIBLE CIVILIANISATION OF AIRMEN POSTS: AND FOR THE
COMMON CEILING

42. THE US PROPOSAL OF 15 JAN, IN RESPECT OF GROUND FORCES, WOULD NOT CHANGE THE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT, NOR THE WORKING GROUP JUDGEMENTS AS TO ITS EFFECTIVENESS, AS COMPARED WITH THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL.
AS STATED PREVIOUSLY, ACCURATE VERIFICATION OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OR RESIDUAL LEVELS COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED.

43. CIVILIANISATION. US POSSIBLE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AT CERTAIN SCALES COULD INVOLVE SOME CIVILIANISATION AND RESORT TO CIVIL CONTRACT SERVICES. DIRECT SUBSTITUTION OF CIVILIANS FOR SERVICEMENT COULD BE CHALLENGED AS CIRCUMVENTING THE SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS. FORCES ON BOTH SIDES EMPLOY CIVILIANS DIRECTLY, OPERATE CIVILIAN CONTRACT SERVICES, AND DRAW ON CIVILIAN INDUSTRIAL AND UTILITY RESOURCES, TO VARYING DEGREESS. IT IS PROBABLE, BUT UNVERIFIABLE, THAT THE WEST USE A GREATER NUMBER OF DIRECTLY EMPLOYED CIVILIANS THAN THE WARSAW PACT IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. THE WARSAW PACT
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01001 06 OF 07 242021Z

NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA HAVE SUGGESTED THATTHIS IS SO, AND THAT THESE CIVILIANS REDUCE THE "MANPOWER DISPARITY" BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IF CIVILIANISATION (DIRECT SUBSTITUTION OF CIVILIAN LABOUR FOR SERVICEMENT) WERE TO BE ACCEPTED AS A CIRCUMVENTION, THIS WOULD EFFECTIVELY PLACE A CEILING ON THE DIRECT EMPLOYMENT OF CIVILIAN LABOUR RESOURCES IN THE NGA WHICH COULD BE UTILISED BY THE ARMED FORCES, WHETHER THESE RESOURCES WERE ACQUIRED BY CONTRACT OR THROUGH TRADITIONAL USE OF CIVIL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES (E.G.

TRANSPORT). THE REPERCUSSIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS OF SUCH A LIMITATION EVEN IF CONFINED ONLY TO CIVILIAN LABOUR DIRECTLY EMPLOYED BY THE ARMED FORCES, WOULD IMPOSE A SERIOUS LIMITATION ON FREEDOM TO RESTRUCTURE AND RATIONALISE WITHIN NATO. IF THE PROBLEM PROVED REAL IN THE EVENT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS FOR NATO BY MEANS OF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION THAT WOULD PROHIBIT THE CIVILIANISATION OF COMBAT POSTS BUT ALLOW THAT OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS. HOWEVER, CIVILIANISATION OF COMBAT AS DISTINCT FROM ADMINISTRATIVE POSTS WOULD ITSELF PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL GROUND FOR CHALLENGE. FOR AIR FORCES, IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT PRACTICALLY ANY AIRMAN WHO IS NOT AN AIRCREW MEMBER (OR A SAM/AAA CREWMAN), SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS "ADMINISTRATIVE" IN THIS CONTEXT. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, TO ENSURE THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOCUS ON THE UNIFORMED ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES. TO THE EXTENT THAT REDUCTIONS ARE NEGOTIATED OR EXPRESSED IN MANPOWER, IT WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT THAT ANY AGREEMENT SHOULD BE EXPLICIT IN CONFINING ITSELF TO ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL SERVING IN THE ARMED FORCES.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE US PROPOSAL AND THE COMMON CEILING REQUIREMENTS

44. THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING, WITHOUT AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS REPORTS, WHICH DISCUSSED, INTER ALIA, MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THOSE REPORTS REMAIN VALID IN RESPECT OF A COMBINED COMMON CEILING INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER WITH POSSIBLE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. THE WORKING GROUP FOUND THAT AT LEAST TWO OF THESE MEANS COULD BE ADOPTED WITHOUT ADVERSE MILITARY EFFECTS FOR THE ALLIES. THESE WERE:

A. A COMBINED GROUND/AIR MANPOWER COMMON CEILING WITH SPECIFIED SUB-CEILINGS ON AIR AND ON GROUND MANPOWER.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01001 06 OF 07 242021Z

B. A COMBINED GROUND/AIR MANPOWER COMMON CEILING WITH SPECIFIED SUB-CEILINGS ON GROUND MANPOWER ONLY.

45. THE US PROPOSAL OF 15 JAN DOES NOT SPECIFY THE METHOD TO BE ADOPTED TO DEFINE AND IMPLEMENT A COMBINED COMMON CEILING. HOWEVER, THE US NOTE OF 16 JAN 75 INDICATES A US PREFERENCE FOR A SOLUTION WHICH SHOULD ALLOW SCOPE, FOR BOTH SIDES, TO MAKE LIMITED TRANSFERS BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER STRENGTHS WITHIN A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING DEFINED IN NUMERICAL TERMS. FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES UNDER THE US PROPOSAL, THIS FIGURE WOULD BE 900,000. UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT, NUMERICAL SUB-CEILINGS FOR GROUND OR AIR MANPOWER WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE EXPRESSED IN AN AGREEMENT.

46. THE FREEDOM TO TRANSFER, POST-MBFR, BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER, IF UNCONSTRAINED, WOULD ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO INCREASE GROUND MANPOWER AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR AND VICE VERSA. THUS THE WP COULD, IF NOT CONSTRAINED, REPLACE THE GROUND MANPOWER

REDUCED, BY REDUCING THEIR AIR MANPOWER. THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY
TO ALLIED OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01001 07 OF 07 242058Z

64

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 EB-07 /094 W

----- 026425

R 241620Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0279

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 7 USNATO 1001

47. THE US APPROACH WOULD PROVIDE A CONSTRAINT ON SUCH
ACTION BY APPLYING A FORMULA WHICH WOULD PROHIBIT SIGNIFICANT
ALTERATION, BE EITHER SIDE, OF THE GROUND/AIR MANPOWER RATIO
EXISTING AFTER AGREED REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN EFFECTED. THE PRIME
ALLIED REQUIREMENT, IN THIS CONTEXT, WOULD BE TO PREVENT THE
REPLACEMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL GROUND FORCES REDUCED UNDER AN AGREEMENT.
THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY ALLOWED FOR TRANSFERS BETWEEN GROUND AND
AIR PERSONNEL SHOULD THEREFORE BE BASED AT A LEVEL WHICH WOULD
ENSURE A REASONABLE ALLOWANCE FOR POSSIBLE RESTRUCTURING AND
SIMILARLY ENSURE THAT THE NUMERS TRANSFERABLE FROM AIR TO GROUND
PERSONNEL WOULD BE TOLERABLE. PROVIDED THE COMBINED GROUND/
AIR COMMON CEILING WERE AGREED AND EXPRESSED NUMERICALLY IN
AN MBFR AGREEMENT, THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE COULD BE DEFINED
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE COMBINED COMMON CEILING FIGURE.

REDEFINITION OF FORCES

48. THE CURRENT ALLIED TABLED PROPOSAL (NAC 2948) WHICH

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01001 07 OF 07 242058Z

ADDRESSES ONLY GROUND FORCES COULD NECESSITATE DEFINITION OF

"GROUND FORCES" TO BE CONSIDERED FOR REDUCTIONS, BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENT PRACTICES ADOPTED BY NATO, THE WP AND INDIVIDUAL NATIONS IN ALLOTING TASKS (E.G. AREA AIR DEFENCE) TO GROUND AND AIR FORCES. THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS WOULD MEAN THAT, SINCE ALL GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER MAY BE CONSIDERED AND AS THE ULTIMATE AIM IS A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING, IT COULD NOT BE CLAIMED THAT THE ALLIES, BY EXCLUDING ALLIED AIR MANPOWER OR TASKS CARRIED OUT BY WP GROUND FORCES, WERE SEEKING REDUCTIONS IN DISSIMILAR FORCES IN A WAY WHICH WORKS TO ALLIED ADVANTAGE. UNDER THE US PROPOSAL, SUCH FORCES AS THE NATO AIR FORCE MANNED SAM AND THE CSSR/POLISH ARMY MANNED AREA AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE COMBINED COUNT OF AIR PLUS GROUND MANPOWER, PRE AND POST-REDUCTIONS.

EXCEPTIONS FOR TRAINING, EXERCISES AND ROTATIONS.

49. AS INDICATED IN A PREVIOUS REPORT, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR LIMITED AND DEFINED TEMPORARY FLUCTUATIONS, ABOVE AGREED NORMAL FORCE LEVELS, DUE TO TRAINING, EXERCISES AND ROTATIONS. THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD APPLY EQUALLY IF THE COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING APPROACH ENVISAGED IN THE US NOTE OF 15 JAN WERE ADOPTED.

50. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY, IN ANY MBFR AGREEMENT DERIVING FROM EXISTING ALLIED PROPOSAL ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, TO PROVIDE AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION, BY EITHER SIDE, THROUGH THE INCREASE OF AIR FORCES, THIS COULD BE ASSISTED, TO A LIMITED EXTENT, BY A NON-INCREASE AGREEMENT FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER. SUCH A LIMITATION IN AIR MANPOWER ALONE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY PREVENT AN INCREASE, BY EITHER SIDE, IN AIR FORCE COMBAT CAPABILITY, ACHIEVED THROUGH RESTRUCTURING WITHIN EXISTING MANPOWER RESOURCES OR THROUGH CHANGES OF ORGANISATION AND SERVICING/SUPPORT ARRANGEMENT. THESE CONSIDERATIONS WOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO THE US PROPOSAL OF 15 JAN WHICH ALSO PROVIDES FOR POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN AND LIMITATION ON, AIR MANPOWER.

51. THE US PROPOSAL FOR A FIXED COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING WITH LIMITED FLEXIBILITY TO TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH ALLIED OBJECTIVES. THE
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01001 07 OF 07 242058Z

EXTENT OF FLEXIBILITY ALLOWED WOULD DEPEND TO A LARGE EXTENT ON THE NATURE AND MODALITIES OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

ANNEX A IS THE SAME AS TRANSMITTED WITH PREVIOUS WG DRAFT, SEE USNATO 853.

ANNEX B
NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF US PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO
PHASE TWO

1. THE BASIC MANPOWER STRENGTHS THAT ARE USED TO SHOW THE NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF THE US PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO PHASE TWO ARE SHOWN IN ANNEX A, PARA 1.

2. NUMERICAL EFFECTS WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REMAINING REDUCTIONS TOWARD THE COMMON CEILING:

A. TOTAL AMOUNT OF MANPOWER (AIR PLUS GROUND) TO BE REDUCED TO ARRIVE AT AN OVERALL COMMON CEILING OF 900,000:

	NATO	WP
TOTAL (AI PLUS GROUND)	986,000	1,145,000
COMMON CEILING	900,000	900,000
OVERALL REDUCTIONS	86,000	245,000

B. AMOUNT OF MANPOWER (AIR PLUS GROUND) REMAINING TO BE REDUCED AFTER COMPLETION OF PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS:

	NATO	WP
OVERALL REDUCTIONS	86,000	245,000
PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS	34,050	81,600
REDUCTIONS REMAINING	51,950	163,400

C. NUMBER AND PERCENTAGES OF NATO GROUND FORCES (INCLUDING US PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS) THAT WOULD BE REDUCED TO MEET THE ILLUSTRATIVE COMMON CEILING OF 90,000 IF THE USE WERE TO REDUCTIONS 5, 10 OR 15 PERCENT OF ITS AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE ONE (IF THERE WERE TO BE NO FURTHER AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS):

REQUIRED NATO GROUND REDUCTIONS		
PHASE ONE AIR CUT	NUMBERS	PERCENTAGE
5PERCENT	84,300 (86,000 - 1,700)	10.7PRCNT(84,300-790,000)
	:	
10PERCENT	82,600 (86,000 - 3,400)	10.6PRCNT(82,600-790,000)
SECRET		

PAGE 04 NATO 01001 07 OF 07 242058Z

C		
15PERCENT	80,900 (86,000 - 5,100)	10.2PRCNT(80,900-790,000)
	:	

3. EXISTING AND RESIDUAL (AFTER US PROPOSED PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS)

NATO AND WP MANPOWER STRENGTHS IN THE NGA:

	NATO	WP	DISPARITIES
EXISTING ASSESSED STRENGTH	986,000	1,145,000	- 159,000
COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE	900,000	900,000	
GROUND FORCES, EXISTING	790,000	937,000	- 147,000
RESIDUAL GROUND FORCES, IF			
ALL REDUCTIONS BORNE BY THEM	704,000	692,000	PLUS12,000
RESIDUAL GROUND FORCES, IF AIR			
MANPOWER BEARS REDUCTIONS OF			
15 PERCENT	733,000	723,000	PLUS10,000
AIR FORCES, EXISTING	196,000	208,000	- 12,000

RESIDUAL AIR FORCES, IF AIR

BEARS REDUCTIONS OF

15PERCENT 167,000 177,000 - 10,000

4. HYPOTHETICAL REDUCTION OPTIONS IN PHASE II ASSUMING US/USSR

MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I AT 15PERCENT OVERALL, INCLUDING 10
PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER

	NATO			WP		
	GND	AIR	TOTAL	GND	AIR	TOTAL
RESIDUAL FORCES AT						
END PHASE I	759,400	192,600	952,000	862,000	201,500	1,063,500

REDUCTIONS LEFT FOR

PHASE II	52,000	163,500
----------	--------	---------

AIR REDUCTIONS

5PERCENT	42,400	9,600	52,000	153,400	10,100	163,500
----------	--------	-------	--------	---------	--------	---------

AIR REDUCTIONS

10PERCENT	32,700	19,200	52,000	143,300	20,200	163,500
-----------	--------	--------	--------	---------	--------	---------

SECRET

PAGE 05 NATO 01001 07 OF 07 242058Z

AIR REDUCTIONS

15PERCENT	23,200	28,800	52,000	133,200	30,300	163,500
-----------	--------	--------	--------	---------	--------	---------

END TEXT

MCAULIFFE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 24 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO01001
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750286/abbrziju.tel
Line Count: 1166
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 22
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: (A) USNATO 932; (B) USNATO 853; (C) USNATO 764; (D) USNATO 686; (E) USNATO 560; (F) STATE 20905; (G) STATE 22970; (H) STATE 31509
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 MAR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31 MAR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <02 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: WORKING GROUP PAPER ON US AIR MANPOWER PROPOSALS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO BONN
LONDON
MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006